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Abstract. Th e analogy between semiosphere (world of cultures) and biosphere (world 
of life), coined by J. Lotman, is a courageous attempt to interconnect two seemingly 
incompatible worlds. In congruence with his view, I would like to convince the reader 
that the only possible general defi nition of life is “a  system born, endowed with 
semiosis, with history”. Such a view requires considering biosphere and semiosphere 
as coextensive, which requires merging the cultural, scientifi c, historical, and linguistic 
approaches into a coherent whole.2 
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In general terms we can say that the structure of symbols of a particular 
culture shapes the system which is isomorphic and isofunctional to the genetic 
memory of an individual. (Lotman 1990: 111)
An intrinsic contrast of any living culture resides in a struggle to maximize the 
tendency towards its structuration, and an unavoidable consequence of such a 
trend – automatism. (Lotman, Uspenskij 2010[1971]: 485)3
1  Acknowledgements. Supported by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic 13-24275S.
2  Based on the presentation at the Tartu Summer Scool of Semiotics, Kääriku, Estonia, 18–
23 August 2013.
3 Противоречие   между постоянным стремлением довести системность до предела 
и постоянной же борьбой с порождаемыми в результате этого автоматизмом струк-
туры внутренне, органически присуще всякой живой культуре. Lotman, Uspenskij 
2010[1971]: 485–503 (translation mine, A.M.).
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1. Two introductory remarks
It is an inevitable consequence of a life-long activity of great personalities that their 
favourite concepts oft en evolve considerably in the fl ow of decades. A reader of 
the collected works, then, notices many inconsistencies, even contradictions when 
reading through such a volume. 
1.1. Th is is also the case of the concept of ‘text’ in Juri Lotman’s oeuvres (he readily 
accepts the fact: see, e.g. the very fi rst sentence in Lotman 2009). A naive reader 
will oft en and urgently ask the question: “Well, what is not a text, then”? Out of 
the eight meanings of the word, as contained in the comprehensive dictionary of 
Lotmanian terms (Levchenko, Salupere 1999), the entry “Text II” comes closest 
to my understanding. In this essay I will use the term exclusively in the sense of a 
linear string (sequence) of alphabetical (i.e. digital) characters that is accessible to 
extraction of meaning when read by a speaker of some natural language. It should be 
understood that a text is not a material entity, as absolute digitality cannot be attained 
in the material world; rather a text is an “avatar” embodied in an appearance of, e.g. 
book or CD.4
It follows also that I shall not consider scripts written in artifi cial languages as sensu 
stricto texts, neither do I comprehend spoken utterances as such. All multifarious 
Lotmanian usages of the word ‘text’ should be replaced by words like ‘artefacts’, 
‘appearance’, ‘self-presentation’, ‘likeness’, etc. Th e distinction will help to expand my 
reception of Lotman to the sphere of living beings as dwellers and/or builders of the 
biosphere-which-is-semiosphere. (For a diff erent approach to the concept of ‘text’ see 
Kull 2002; he is much closer to other Lotmanian usages than I am.)
1.2. My second comment concerns important “just so” remarks oft en made en passant 
in some marginal text. Such is – at least to my knowledge – Lotman’s pansemiotic 
belief expressed in a letter to B. A. Uspenskij, dated March 19, 1982: 
[At one occasion] I dared to express my conviction that a text [in its broadest 
sense, see above] can exist only when preceded by some other text; that any 
developed culture should be preceded by an advanced culture. Now I learn from 
Vernadskij […] that life can be born only from life, i.e. if it is preceded by [some 
other form of] life. He concludes: science can be built only on facts that can be 
observed and/or reconstructed. Nowhere in the universe has the turn of non-life 
into life been observed; neither can it be reconstructed. […] Hence, all hypotheses 
4 In this respect, I disagree with Hoff meyer and Emmeche 2005 who envisage both digital 
and cultural codes as situated in material world. For details, see, e.g. Markoš, Faltýnek 2009; 
2015. 
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concerning origins of life come out as mere speculations. […] A message becomes 
a message only if preceded by a semiotic sphere. Solely the existence of reason 
[ ] explains the existence of reason.5 (Lotman 2010: 683–684, translation 
mine, A.M.) 
I give this example in order to stress that similar pansemiotic statements can be found 
in works of many other authors working in semiotics or cosmology (e.g. Peirce, 
Hoff meyer, Jantsch, Ruyer, etc.). Hence the idea of a universe endowed with meaning 
and giving birth to all its appearances is tempting. It will, however, blur the diff erence 
between life and non-life (and consequently, culture and non-culture as well6). I 
therefore prefer the distinction between life and non-life. In this treatise, however, 
I am not going to discuss the singularity of life’s origin; for the sake of the argument 
I shall maintain with Lotman that life (which is culture, as I will argue) can be born 
exclusively from the living (for more details, see Markoš forthcoming, 2015). 
2. Lineages as cultures
I espouse the notion of cultural properties of organismal lineages, species, and 
ecosystems, as opposed the genocentric7 view of evolution. In 2002, I came up with 
the following analogy:
How many cultures have arisen based on diff erent interpretations of a  single 
canonical text – the Bible? We will fi nd no diffi  culties here, because, along with 
the text, people (or peoples) also transmit the way to interpret it. But who is 
the interpreter in a biological species? In addition to the canonical text – two 
5  [Я однажды] осмелился вслух высказать свое убеждение в том, что текст может 
существовать (т.е. быть социально осознан как текст), если ему предшествовал 
другой текст, и что любой развитой культуре должна была предшествовать развитая 
культура. И вот сейчас я обнаружил у Вернадского ... что жизнь может возникнуть 
толь ко из живого, т.е. если ей предшествует жизнь. Он рассуждает так: наука мо-
жет основываться лишь на фактах, наблюдаемых или реконструируемых. Момент 
превращения не-жизни в жизнь нигде во Вселенной не наблюдается и не реконструируется.  
[...] А все гипотезы о происхождении жизни – спекуляции. [...] Только предшествие 
семио тической сферы делает сообщение сообщением. Только существование разума 
объясняет существование разума.
6  Th is happens to Lotman who explains how a culture diff erentiates between ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’, just to admit that as soon as an item is being recognized in the outer world, it becomes 
semiotized hence becomes internal.
7  Th e “genocentric belief ” takes for granted that genes are represented by linear strings of 
bases in DNA; whatever the appearance of a living being may be, it is a function of the DNA 
script – understood as programs controlling all, or almost all, traits.
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versions of genome inherited from our parents [containing inscriptions of genetic 
texts] – we also inherit a small but very important piece of body: the egg cell. […] 
Th e fertilized egg manipulates the genetic text according to rules inherited from 
countless generations of its predecessors. Driven by this tradition it builds the 
specifi c morphology.8 I maintain that a species can be understood as a culture; it 
follows that the emergence of new species may equally be a matter of the mutation 
of the text (DNA) and/or changes in the rules for manipulating it. (Markoš 2002: 42)
Inspired by the Distributed Language Group (e.g., Cowley 2012) and by the work 
of Rappaport (2010), our group developed the view further and speculate that the 
interpretative capacity of species-cultures highly surpasses (as to their informational 
content) the genetic script stored in DNA (Markoš et al. 2013). Th is brings us closer 
to views of the Tartu School, as I hope to explain below. To proceed, I shall fi rst give 
explanations on (1) how a newborn individual becomes coupled to the (pre)existing 
biosphere/semiosphere; and (2) how current views on evolution fi t into the picture.
2.1. Two-phase development (ontogenesis)
For multicellular organisms (most living beings on our planet) we propose the 
“indoctrination” of newborn individual into the actual state of aff airs in the population, 
ecosystem, biosphere – by parents and other dwellers of its surrounding, plus, of course, 
by the reigning physical conditions. Actually, the process is biphasic (see Pátková et 
al. 2012). In the fi rst phase the mother organism goes into great pains to insulate its 
germs (zygotes, spores, and early embryo they give rise to) from the rest of biosphere 
(by developing sophisticated envelopes like, e.g. egg-shells). Th e newly-emerging 
organism, thus, can be considered to be a reader of its genetic text(s) according to 
hermeneutic instructions provided by its mother (in some lineages, e.g. mammals or 
seed plants, the mother organism retains its exclusive access even in this phase). As 
soon as the threshold of organogenesis has been attained, a drastic turn occurs: the 
“germ-free” and “solipsistic” individual becomes “contaminated”, and it starts actively 
establishing multiple links to its kin as well as to the rest of biosphere/semiosphere, 
and with the world beyond its borders. From this point on, the individual becomes a 
member of its culture, learns (and is introduced to) its contexts.9 Its unique genetic 
8 Instead of ‘morphology’, today I would use ‘appearance’, ‘likeness’, ‘form’. I maintain that 
words like ‘biology’, ‘psychology’ ‘morphology’, etc., denote special sciences developed for 
modelling manifestations of life, but not appearances of life themselves. See Markoš et al. 2009.
9 At the fi rst sight the model resembles that developed by M. Barbieri 2003; here, the 
“solipsistic” phase regulated by organic codes is followed by reconstruction of organic memory, 
that is not explicitly written in the genome – it only provides the rules for such a reconstruction. 
Note, however, that the reconstruction as proposed by Barbieri draws on internal resources 
and does not presume community links.
 Biosphere as semiosphere: Variations on Lotman  491
endowment, and its unique bodily structure is confronted with, and interpreted 
according to, the actual contexts of the biosphere/semiosphere – it follows that the 
fi nal appearance (the “phenotype”) of a newcomer is not determined but negotiated 
by its “cultural” milieu.
Uniqueness of instructions for the proper (i.e. species-specifi c) reading of genetic 
script becomes apparent when one realizes that the script is quite universal; i.e. 
not its “wording” but interpretation (by the body of the cell and embryo) is crucial 
for early morphogenetic processes. Th e importance of linking to the world can be 
demonstrated on the sorry state of animals or plants artifi cially kept in a germ-free 
and/or gnotobiotic states.10
2.2. Plasticity and elasticity
Aft er Darwin, most biologists accepted that evolution is a process not deterministic, 
but historical: as in human historiography, trends can be revealed only ex post (and 
may diff er from the points of view of diff erent historians, social groups, or nations), 
but cannot be predicted from our knowledge of past and present events. Darwin’s 
view of evolution as a smooth, gradual change proceeding by infi nitesimal steps in 
successive generations, however, received only minimal support from paleontology. 
Fossil records usually witness abrupt appearance of new life-forms that subsequently 
last for longer period, fi nally to get extinct. To reconcile theory with paleontological 
data, diff erent versions of punctuated evolution were suggested, in the frames of the 
Darwinian paradigm. 
Here I am outlining one version of such a theory, developed by J. Flegr and dubbed 
“frozen evolution” (Flegr 2008; 2010; 2013). Flegr argues that lineages of organisms 
(populations, species, and even higher taxons) go through two phases of evolution. 
Th e fi rst, plastic phase is typical of the founder population in its beginnings; the 
population is apt to embark on a plethora of trajectories that meet the requirements 
of the environment. In the later phase (comprising 98% of the lifetime of the lineage), 
however, it becomes frozen and only “unwillingly” moves away from its equilibrium 
when forced by the environment. As soon as such a forcing ceases, the population 
returns to the norm. In other words, no trajectories into new morphospace appear in 
the frozen state any more. Natural selection is ineffi  cient, and the population (species) 
thrives unchanged (oft en as marginal) under changing conditions, until it gets a last 
kick when conditions become incompatible with its survival. Only on rare occasions 
may parts of such a population re-enter the plastic phase and start a new round of 
evolution. Th e model is genocentric, and Flegr explains its working in frames of 
10  An organism is an ecosystem of hundreds of symbionts. Artifi cially, the newly developing 
animal fetus may be kept under absolutely sterile, i.e. germ-free conditions, or it can be grown 
in a state of gnotobiosis, in the presence of only one or a small number of symbionts.
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neo-Darwinian paradigm. In the fi rst phase, the population is small and its genetic 
heterogeneity is limited; any mutation has a chance to get amplifi ed, to infl uence 
the body parametres (phenotype), and to get selected by natural selection. As the 
population grows in numbers (both of individuals and genetic heterogeneity), the web 
of gene interactions (epistasis, polygenic inheritance, etc.) becomes more and more 
complicated, any mutation and any eff ect from the environment would be probably 
buff ered (“frozen”), without any eff ect on the overall appearance of its members.
Th e scenario, however, may hold even beyond the frames of genocentric 
explanation. For example, E.  Danchin 2013 argues that “written”, textual genetic 
information (i.e. that stored in DNA as a genetic script) may explain only several 
percent of trait variation in a species; the rest relying on other resources, like epigenetic 
recording, outlasting cellular structures, “ritualized” processes of development and/or 
behaviour, even fashion. In short, we are dealing with cultural processes isomorphic – 
and developing in similar ways – as described in cultural sciences.
In my opinion, the potential of the species’ appearances goes far beyond what that 
appearance reveals at a given period. Evolution is dependent not only on random 
errancy of script transcription: most of its potential goes beyond it. Th is brings us to 
the Tartu School. “In the center there is situated a certain normal ‘we’, to which other 
peoples are opposed as a paradigmatic set of anomalies”, we read in the 1973 Th eses 
(Uspenskij et al. 1973a, Th esis 1.2.4; Russian original 1973b). To what extent could 
this statement be broadened from peoples and their cultures to the whole realm of the 
living: is it allowed to replace ‘peoples’ by concepts like ‘species’, ‘lineage’, ‘community’, 
‘ecosystem’, even ‘biosphere’? Do such formations exist in the world, or do they 
represent merely our abstractions? If they do exist, are they entitled to say “we”?
 
3. Stasis and turn
S. Kauff man in his Investigations devoted to the evolution of biospheres, coins a 
following conjecture: “Our, and any, biosphere, expands the dimensionality of its 
Adjacent Possible [i.e. immediate future], on average, as rapidly as it can” (Kauff man 
2000: 175). His biospheres-econospheres develop according to self-organized critica-
lity models: they proceed in time smoothly, but their evolution is punctuated by 
complexity catastrophes – avalanches of small or big disturbances generated from 
inside the system that cannot be predicted as to both their size and onset. Th e word 
“catastrophe” is used in its original meaning – a sudden turn in behaviour of the 
system, not necessarily destructive (a felix culpa). In whatever phase of its evolution, 
however, the biosphere-econosphere-semiosphere should be resilient enough to avoid 
a “bonfi re”, a magnifi cent, but explosive self-destruction. Th is brings us to Lotman and 
his views of cultural evolution in his book Culture and Explosion (Lotman 2009[1992]) 
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and other treatises. He is, in my opinion, similar to Kauff man, but for the word 
“explosion” (взрыв); what he is describing are indeed rather catastrophes or turns. 
Otherwise I fi nd many isomorphisms with the views presented above. Culture as its 
own “entry”, a generator of knowledge “from inside” (e.g. Lotman 1989), building its 
semiosphere (an upgraded version of umwelt perhaps that can and does evolve). 
4. Living?
Below, I am proposing three triads that will help understanding the nature of life and 
its contrast with the non-living:
(1) causality – code – semiosis;
(2) creation – emergence – birth;
(3) duration – deterministic evolution – history.
It has been notoriously known that none of the many defi nitions of life is satisfactory, 
and if a list of properties is provided instead, one may never be sure if it is complete. I 
suggest but a game with nine words: the fi rst group defi nes “achievements” of complex 
systems, the second refl ects their coming into being, and the third their behaviour in 
time. 
4.1. Complex systems 
4.1.1. Th e fi rst – “metabolic” phase of the development of biology as a science was 
driven by the well-known slogan “nothing but physics and chemistry” and by the 
concept of “mechanism”. Th is “nothing but” was, I suspect, a remnant of old encounters 
with vitalists; aft er all, nobody denied ultrastructural requirements that could not be 
created “from scratch” on the lab bench. (“Mechanism” is even older, a euphemism for 
Cartesian “machine”, I suspect.) 
“Deterministic and canalized set of chemical reactions explainable by physics and 
chemistry” may be the right formulation of the metabolic phase of biology. Chemical 
composition, structure and ultrastructure (“contraptions”), and metabolism were key 
topics of study. With the onset of cybernetics, biology absorbed also the notion of 
regulation and feedback fl ows. Th is phase ended with a Heracleitan view of life as a 
steady state: everything is in a fl ow, in a permanent change, just to remain the same. 
Note that cyclic processes remain in the centre of attention: to describe acyclic events 
like ontogenesis by means of equilibrium thermodynamics is not an easy task.
Most of contemporary biology, physiology, ethology, and medicine are the result 
of this phase that ended roughly in the 1970s.
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4.1.2. Th e discovery of biological codes marked a new chapter. A code cannot be 
derived from physics – it is a product of a convention (a term coined by M. Barbieri; 
see, e.g. 2003), a (fi nal) set of rules how to translate information from one set of 
inscription into another one. A paradigmatic example is, of course, the genetic code, 
but see Barbieri’s book (plus many papers on the topic published by him especially 
in the journal Biosemiotics) for more examples. Th e code, then, is a necessary 
precondition for life. However, the same period (1950s–1970s) also marked the 
onset of the computer age; with programmable machines we were again left  with a 
dilemma: either living beings are “nothing but” analogies of computers, or computers 
are alive as we are (later on, they will perhaps also think with their silicon minds 
and outcompete us in evolutionary struggle). In short, existence of code is not a 
satisfactory precondition for distinguishing life from non-life. Moreover, recent 
achievements in epigenetics show that codes may not be as “frozen” as was considered 
by the founders of molecular biology. Th e rules employed, e.g., in ontogenesis, may 
develop in the fl ow of generations, and display many “dialects” in diff erent lineages 
(Markoš, Švorcová 2009; Švorcová 2012).
But biology succeeded to accomplish a very important trick: in spite of the fact 
that codes are not deducible from physics, it turned out that code-driven systems can 
easily be studied by procedures of natural sciences: as to methods, paragraph 4.1.1 
and 4.1.2 can merge into one. Th e code biology, even if not a natural science, can be 
studied by methods of natural sciences (a similar example is, e.g., econophysics). Such 
an approach gave rise to molecular biology, neurophysiology, code biology, and many 
theories of mind and behaviour.
4.1.3. Semiosis, the ability of interpretation based in memory, history, experience 
and context resists reduction into a set of simple rules and code tables – therefore 
it cannot be subject of sciences. Biosemiotics, then, when and if stating that life and 
semiosis are coextensive, must draw inspiration from humanities, with three types of 
danger: (1) its exploration will leave the safe territory of biology, facing once again 
(2) allegations of vitalism from biologists. Moreover, (3) semiotics proper, as almost 
exclusively human-oriented activity, will become very suspicious against statements 
of semiotic achievements of plants or even bacteria. What is most important here, 
however, semiotic beings work with texts (both in their narrow defi nition as strings of 
characters, as well as texts in a Lotmanian sense); the text necessarily is code-based, 
but its message is not known: it should be deciphered, reconstructed,11 or even created 
11 Меняется соотношение текста и кода (языка). Осознавая некоторый объект как 
текст, мы тем самым предполагаем, что он каким-то образом закодирован, презумпция 
координованности входит в понятие текста. Однако сам этот код нам неизвестен – 
его еще предстоит реконструировать, основываясь на данном нам тексте. (Lotman 
2009: 312)
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anew12 in a new cultural, historical, religious, or language constellation, oft en with an 
open end...
Biologists should draw inspiration from modern semiotics (U. Eco, J. Deely, J. 
Lotman) and hermeneutics (M. Heidegger, H.-G. Gadamer) but, at the same time, 
avoid being driven into problems concerning exclusively (adult and literate) humans. 
It is, surprisingly, not a trivial task to defi ne such exclusive areas having no (at least 
primitive) counterparts elsewhere. 
4.2. Coming into existence
Th e problem has been discussed since the beginning of our culture – see, e.g. the fysis 
of ancient Greeks, or creatio ex nihilo in scholastic Christianity. For our purposes, I 
suggest three alternatives for how complex systems can arise:
4.2.1. Creation, i.e. bringing to existence by God or by a craft sman, be it a human 
engineer (e.g. computers) or some other living being (e.g. anthills). In any case, the 
forming agency, as well as the plan (recipe) comes from outside of the system; the 
system is passive towards its designer.
4.2.2. Emergence is a process creating complex systems spontaneously, “out of nothing”, 
from a singularity in some unstructured homogeneous system, and repeatedly under 
specifi c conditions. Examples: growth of crystals, fl ames, stars, gyres, tornadoes, 
etc. Th e above-mentioned homogeneous primordium should be situated in a steep 
gradient of energy; the rules how such a dissipative structure develops are, however, 
internal, no external designer is necessary. Th e dissipative structure may have a very 
long lifespan (stars, galaxies) but they lack memory diff erent from the structure itself; 
of course, as they emerge from a singularity, no memory of previous cases is available, 
either. As they come up in many exemplars, their structure and development can be 
studied and described scientifi cally.
4.2.3. For our investigation the most interesting is the third group of complex 
systems – let us call them cultures – that will not emerge from scratch but must be born 
from some pre-existing structure of similar complexity; such are human civilizations, 
languages, religions, cultures, fashions, and even living beings (see the Introductory 
remark). Th anks to the existence of codes (oft en preserved and copied as texts), as 
well as memory and trans-generational transmission of experience (Švorcová 2012), 
the systems are able to accumulate knowledge, absorb novelty, and develop new ways 
12 В общей системе культуры тексты выполняют по крайней мере две основные функ-
ции: адекватную передачу значений и порождение новых смыслов. (Lotman 2009: 313)
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of existence. As also mentioned in the Introduction, origins of such systems are lost 
deep in the past and cannot be studied eff ectively – (historical) narrations are more 
appropriate here than scientifi c descriptions.
While dissipative structures emerge from singularities, cultures are born from 
pluralities.
4.3. Time-course
Th e third group of concepts concerns behaviour of our systems in time, along the 
arrow of time going from the past to future. 
4.3.1. Th e simplest form is a simple standstill, duration while “doing nothing”. Th e 
fl ow of time can be recorded only by the trend to higher entropy, i.e. wearing away; at 
maximum entropy attainable, in equilibrium, time disappears. 
4.3.2. Systems with deterministic, predictable evolution (calculable or statistically 
decipherable). Such is the evolution of stars or, say, diseases, but also ontogenesis of 
many forms of life (with a predominant “solipsist” phase of development, see above, 
2.1). If codes are involved, they remain constant, or elicit very slow changes in time. 
4.3.3. Most interesting from our point of view will be systems capable of semiosis, 
i.e. systems which – besides memory, experience, and ways of handling things are 
endowed with the ability of re-interpreting their own past, i.e. “re-tell” their history 
according to present settings. Here belong systems which are born (4.2.3) and bear 
the memory of countless generations; in fact, living beings only, with their genuine 
history-which-is-evolution. Of course, language, culture, arts, etc. are also born from 
life, so they belong here too. Obviously, such systems cannot be studied in the frame 
of sciences.
4.4. What is life?
Our working defi nition may be “a system born, endowed with semiosis, with history”, 
very similar, if not identical, with that suggested by Kull et al. (2009). Of course, such a 
defi nition is incomplete again and raising many questions. Why doesn’t it encompass 
metabolism, ability of work, reproduction, why not questions of form, bodyness? Why 
not thermodynamic approaches? What about origins of life? All such doubts deserve 
attention and should be further elaborated. Yet I suggest the above working defi nition 
is the most general one, does not apply to the non-living world, and does include all 
living beings, including humans with their language and culture. 
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Биосфера как семиосфера: вариации на тему Лотмана
Приведенная Юрием Лотманом аналогия между семиосферой («миром культуры») 
и биосферой («миром живого») является дерзкой попыткой связать между собой на 
первый взгляд несовместимое. На основе идей Лотмана автор предлагает единственно 
возможное общее определение жизни: «рожденная система, которая обладает семиози-
сом и историей». Такая точка зрения требует, чтобы семио- и биосферу считали сущест-
вующими одновременно, это предполагает соединение культурологического, научного, 
исторического и лингвистического подходов в единое целое. 
Biosfäär kui semiosfäär. Variatsioone Lotmani teemadel
Juri Lotmani poolt loodud analoogia semiosfääri (kultuuride maailma) ja biosfääri (elumaa-
ilma) vahel on vapper katse siduda omavahel kaht näiliselt kokkusobimatut maailma. Koos-
kõlas tema vaadetega tahaksin lugejat veenda, et elu ainuke võimalik ülddefi nitsioon on 
„sündinud süsteem, mis omab semioosi ja ajalugu“. See seisukoht nõuab, et biosfääri ja semio-
sfääri peetaks üheaegselt eksisteerivateks, mis nõuab kultuurilise, teadusliku, ajaloolise ja 
lingvistilise lähenemise liitmist koherentseks tervikuks. 
